470/TA.959
The case concerns a counter-guarantee issued under URDG 758 where a demand was presented but validly refused by the counter-guarantor due to non-compliance with the required wording and failure to satisfy an implementation condition. Although the underlying advance payment had in fact been received, it was not credited in the manner stipulated in the counter-guarantee, and the guarantor's demand did not contain the precise statement required. Following the refusal, no further action was taken, and both the guarantee and counter-guarantee subsequently expired without any formal release being issued.
It was concluded that, under URDG 758 article 25, termination of a guarantee or counter-guarantee occurs automatically upon expiry, irrespective of whether a formal release has been provided. As such, there is no requirement for the counter-guarantor to obtain a release in order to consider its obligation terminated. Accordingly, the counter-guarantor is entitled to close its records once expiry has occurred, as no further liability subsists following termination in accordance with the rules.
470/TA.960
Under a documentary credit subject to UCP 600, the issuing bank honoured a complying presentation and confirmed payment within the required timeframe. However, the actual release of funds was delayed due to sanctions screening by the USD correspondent bank, despite the issuing bank responding promptly to all information requests. The advising bank subsequently claimed interest for the delayed payment, while the correspondent bank declined responsibility, citing regulatory compliance requirements as the cause of the delay.
It was concluded that delayed payment interest in such circumstances falls outside the scope of UCP 600, as the rules do not address delays arising from sanctions or regulatory processes. While it may be argued that the issuing bank bears responsibility vis-à-vis the beneficiary due to its use of a correspondent bank, there is no established standard for assessing the reasonableness of sanctions-related delays. Consequently, any entitlement to interest depends on arrangements between the parties and applicable law, and the inclusion of a sanctions clause in the credit would not materially alter this position, as such regulatory checks apply irrespective of contractual wording.
470/TA.961
The nominated/transferring bank argued that the documents complied in substance with the credit requirements and that the alleged discrepancies were unsupported by either UCP 600 or international standard banking practice. The issuing bank objected to wording on the invoice such as "Solarpark Construction Fee", the inclusion of fulfilment and payment due dates, and reference to bank transfer as payment method, despite no apparent contradiction with the credit terms. It also rejected the CMR for lacking the consignee's address and refused a "Delivery Note" in lieu of a packing list, even though the document contained full packing details and performed the same documentary function. The transferring bank relied heavily on the principle of function over title under ISBP 745 paragraph A39 and argued that absent specific L/C requirements, additional wording or omitted address details were not discrepancies. The issuing bank nevertheless maintained a more formalistic interpretation, ultimately deducting discrepancy fees despite the objections. The request seeks an ICC Opinion on whether any of the discrepancies were genuinely valid under UCP 600 and ISBP practice.
The analysis concludes that the issuing bank adopted an overly formalistic approach to examination and that none of the alleged discrepancies were valid under UCP 600 or ISBP 821. The wording "Solarpark Construction Fee" on the invoice did not conflict with the credit because the invoice also clearly identified the goods in the manner required by the credit. Likewise, the inclusion of a fulfilment date, a payment due date, and the wording "bank transfer" did not create inconsistencies with the terms of the credit or the nature of a sight credit. These references reflected commercial or administrative information relevant to the beneficiary and did not alter the issuing bank's obligations. Under UCP 600 sub-article 14 (d), data need not be identical to that in the credit provided it does not conflict with it, and nothing in the invoice contradicted the credit terms.
The refusal relating to the CMR and the delivery note was also unsupported. The credit did not require a consignee address on the CMR and, under ISBP 821 paragraph J10, address details are not required unless expressly stipulated. The issuing bank's reliance on transport law provisions could not override the examination standards of UCP 600 and ISBP 821. Similarly, the document titled "Delivery Note" fulfilled the function of a packing list because it contained the relevant packing and goods details. UCP 600 sub-article 14 (f) and ISBP 821 paragraph A39 make clear that examination is based on function rather than title alone. Consequently, the presentation complied and none of the discrepancies raised by the issuing bank were valid.
470/TA.962
The issuing bank rejected a presentation because the commercial invoice and packing list did not show a single aggregated total quantity of goods, even though each item quantity was individually stated and the overall shipped quantity could easily be determined by simple addition. The presenter argued that neither UCP 600 nor ISBP 821 requires documents to show mathematically summarised totals where the underlying quantities are already clearly stated. The issuing bank nevertheless relied on ISBP 821 paragraph M6 and UCP 600 article 18 (c), contending that the total quantity formed part of the goods description in the credit and therefore had to appear expressly on the invoice. A second dispute arose over the certificate of origin. Although the certificate listed all required countries of origin and matched the invoice and amended credit overall, the issuing bank claimed it was discrepant because it did not allocate a specific country of origin against each individual goods item or HS code. The presenter rejected this interpretation on the basis that the credit contained no express requirement for item-by-item origin certification. The matter was therefore referred to the ICC Banking Commission for clarification on whether banks may impose such implied documentary requirements under UCP 600 and ISBP 821.
The analysis concludes that the issuing bank imposed requirements that were not contained in the credit, UCP 600, or ISBP 821. Although neither the commercial invoice nor the packing list stated an aggregated total quantity of goods, both documents listed the individual goods items and their respective quantities in full detail. UCP 600 sub-article 18 (c) requires that the description of goods correspond with the credit, but does not require that quantities be expressed in a particular format or that a separate overall total be shown unless expressly stipulated. ISBP 821 paragraphs A22 and M6 clarify that banks examine stated totals and are not obliged to perform calculations, but these provisions do not create a documentary requirement for totals to appear where the credit itself is silent. Nor do they prevent a bank from performing a simple calculation to confirm consistency. As there was no conflict between the documents or with the credit, the absence of a separately stated total quantity did not render either the invoice or packing list discrepant.
The same principle applied to the certificate of origin. The credit merely required certification that the goods originated from the specified countries and did not require origin details to be allocated separately to each individual item or HS code. The certificate of origin listed the required countries, referred to the invoice, and clearly related to the goods shipped. Under ISBP 821 paragraph L1, a certificate of origin is acceptable if it appears to relate to the invoiced goods and certifies their origin.
The issuing bank's insistence on item-by-item origin certification effectively added a requirement not stated in the credit. Since the invoice itself also identified the origins of the goods and no documentary conflict existed, the discrepancy relating to the certificate of origin was likewise invalid. Accordingly, the analysis concludes that none of the discrepancies raised by the issuing bank were justified under UCP 600 or ISBP 821.
470/TA.963
The issuing bank relied on wording inserted in field 78 of the MT700, which stated that EUR 100 handling charges for discrepancies and "our Swift fees being EUR 35.00" would be deducted. Although the documents presented were compliant and no discrepancy fee was applied, the issuing bank nevertheless deducted EUR 35.00 from the reimbursement amount as a Swift fee. The presenter objected on several grounds: firstly, that the wording in field 78 could reasonably be interpreted as linking both the discrepancy charge and the Swift fee to discrepant presentations only; secondly, that no payment advice or Swift confirmation had been requested from the presenter; and thirdly, that field 78 contains only interbank operational instructions and should not override the substantive terms of the credit or UCP 600, particularly the express allocation of charges in field 71D. The issuing bank maintained that the EUR 35.00 Swift fee applied independently of discrepancies and was recoverable from the beneficiary under the instructions contained in field 78. The request therefore seeks ICC Banking Commission clarification on whether such wording authorises unconditional deduction of Swift fees, whether such fees may be deducted absent any requested Swift communication, and whether provisions contained solely within MT700 field 78 can validly modify the operative terms of the credit and bind the beneficiary notwithstanding contrary wording elsewhere in the credit.
The analysis concludes that the issuing bank was not clearly entitled to deduct the EUR 35.00 Swift fee from the proceeds of a complying presentation. Although field 78 of the MT700 referred to "handling charges generated by the discrepancies on the documents presented" followed by "our Swift fees being: EUR 35.00", the wording is ambiguous as to whether the Swift fee applied only in the event of discrepancies or whether it was intended to apply in all circumstances. Given the structure and wording of the clause, it is reasonable to interpret the Swift fee as connected to discrepant presentations. Where ambiguity exists in a credit, it should not operate to the detriment of the beneficiary or presenter. Furthermore, field 71D expressly stated that all banking charges, including those of the issuing bank, were for the applicant's account, creating a clear expectation that no deductions would be made from the proceeds of a complying presentation.
The analysis further emphasises that, according to the Swift User Handbook and ICC Opinion R886, field 78 is intended for bank-to-bank operational instructions rather than conditions affecting the beneficiary's rights or obligations. As such, wording inserted into field 78 should not override or contradict the substantive terms of the credit itself. In this case, the issuing bank attempted through field 78 to qualify the allocation of charges already expressly stated in field 71D. Because the wording in field 78 was both operational in nature and insufficiently clear, it did not effectively displace the express charge allocation in the credit. Accordingly, the issuing bank was not clearly authorised to deduct its Swift charges from the proceeds payable under a complying presentation.
470/TA.964
A transferable credit subject to UCP 600 allowed a 20-day presentation period and was transferred without curtailment of either the expiry date or presentation period. The second beneficiary presented documents within the permitted period, but the transferring bank only completed examination on the fourth day after expiry and subsequently sought substitution of invoices from the first beneficiary. The substitute invoices were received several days later, resulting in the documents only being forwarded to the issuing bank on the twelfth day after expiry and thirty-two days after shipment. The transferring bank considered that the presentation by the second beneficiary had been timely and that a reasonable additional period should be implied for examination, substitution, and re-examination processes inherent in a transfer transaction under article 38. The issuing bank disagreed, refusing the presentation as expired and late, arguing that the five banking day examination period under UCP 600 article 14 (b) did not support such an extended delay and that the transferring bank's covering letter, dated well after expiry and the presentation period, could not reasonably substantiate a confirmation of timely presentation. The request therefore seeks clarification from the ICC Banking Commission on whether additional time may reasonably be implied for substitution procedures under transferable credits, whether the delay allowed to the first beneficiary for substitution was acceptable, and whether the issuing bank was entitled to disregard the transferring bank's confirmation of timely presentation based on the elapsed examination and forwarding periods.
The analysis concludes that the presentation by the second beneficiary was made within the validity and presentation period of the transferred credit and that the subsequent actions of the transferring bank fell within the operational framework contemplated by UCP 600 article 38. Once the second beneficiary's documents were received and examined within the period permitted by UCP 600 sub-article 14 (b), the transferring bank was entitled to approach the first beneficiary for substitution of invoices and drafts under article 38 (h). The substitution process, together with the subsequent examination of the replacement documents, necessarily creates an operational period extending beyond expiry in some transfer transactions. This does not amount to a fresh presentation after expiry, but rather forms part of the transfer and substitution mechanism expressly recognised by article 38. In the circumstances described, the first beneficiary's provision of substitute documents three banking days after request was not unreasonable.
The analysis further concludes that the issuing bank's reliance on the five banking day examination period under UCP 600 sub-article 14 (b) as justification for refusal was misplaced. Sub-article 14 (b) governs the time allowed for examination of a presentation, but does not override or prevent the operational steps required under article 38 once a timely presentation has been made by the second beneficiary.
The fact that the forwarding schedule to the issuing bank was dated after expiry did not, in itself, establish a late presentation, particularly where the transferring bank expressly certified that the documents had been presented within validity and complied with the credit terms. Previous ICC Opinions have recognised that such certifications by nominated or transferring banks are intended to be relied upon in normal interbank practice unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, the analysis concludes that the transferring bank acted consistently with UCP 600 article 38, that the delay associated with substitution was reasonable, and that the issuing bank should not have rejected the presentation on the basis of expiry or late presentation.